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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502: THE “GET
OUT OF JAIL FREE” PROVISION—OR IS IT?
Ann M. Murphy*

INTRODUCTION
At first blush, the “Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Documents” provision now contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to be a godsend to practicing attorneys. The provision was added
when then-President George W. Bush signed it into law on September 19,
2008.1 Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was enacted by Congress, and it provides a saving provision for the inadvertent disclosure of privileged material (attorney-client and attorney work product).2 The change was a
response to the sheer volume of “electronically stored information.”3 In
the past the rule was a wholesale waiver of the privilege if material was
inadvertently disclosed; the waiver is now strictly limited under certain
conditions. Is it really a boon to attorneys, or simply a way for “Big Law”
to save on the costs of litigation, or perhaps neither of these? An individual attorney or a firm seeking to maintain privilege continues to have the

*
Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law, Spokane, Washington.
Professor Murphy expresses her gratitude to the Gonzaga University Law School
Foundation for generously funding this project and to Assistant Professor Patrick
Charles for his assistance. Thank you to Professor Mary Pat Treuthart for her
unwavering encouragement and support.
1. Pub. L. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537; see also 2450, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008) (bill
considered and passed in the Senate); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817-20 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
2008) (debate from the House of Representatives considering and discussing S. 2450);
S. Rep. No. 110-264, at 1–6 (2008) (a report from the Senate Judiciary Committee
considering Senate Bill 2450 and recommending that the bill pass). Rule 502 applies
to all proceedings commenced after the date of enactment “insofar as it is just and
practicable.” Pub. L. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3538.
2. Courtney Ingraffia Barton & David D. Cross, Protecting the Privilege: New
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 23 IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 2, 8
(2009).
3. Electronically Stored Information, or ESI “includes e-mails, webpages, word
processing files, and databases stored in the memory of computers, magnetic disks
(such as computer hard drives and floppy disks), optical disks (such as DVDs and
CDs), and flash memory (such as ‘thumb’ or ‘flash’ drives).” BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN,
RONALD J. HEDGES & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2007),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf.
193
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burden to show a disclosure was inadvertent.4 An attorney is still dutybound to keep a client’s information confidential.5 If an inadvertent disclosure is made, the attorney must seek the protection of Rule 502, or
potentially the attorney has waived not only the privilege for that disclosed document, but also for the entire subject matter mentioned by the
disclosed document.6 A secondary consequence of the disclosure is that
he or she may have violated ethical rules, depending upon the circumstances.7 The damage to the client will be limited, provided the attorney
proves the disclosure was inadvertent. Is the damage similarly limited for
the attorney? The new inadvertent privilege evidence rule has been interpreted in many different ways by courts, creating uncertainty, and it is not
a panacea for the attorney who inadvertently discloses privileged
material.
This article explores this new evidence rule and the consequences
for the attorney and client. The consequences for the client are clearly
spelled out, yet those for the attorney are not. Part I discusses the background and intent of the inadvertent disclosure provision and its relation
to the E-discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Part II illustrates and analyzes U.S. District Court cases decided immediately before the new rule and after, in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. Part III
explores issues attorneys face with individual state ethics rules on confidentiality and inadvertent disclosure, and Part IV gives advice to attorneys and courts that by necessity must face ever-increasing burdens with
electronically stored information and state rules regarding confidentiality.
Finally, the article concludes with thoughts for the future. Due to the
practical impossibility of preventing disclosure in the electronic age, perhaps ethical rules need to be altered to take into account this reality.

4. Amobi v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client . . . .”).
6. See United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the client to a third-party waives the privilege not only as to the
specific communication disclosed, but often as to all other communications relating to
the same subject matter.”) (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808–809 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
7. See, e.g., The State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-179 (2010) (discussing under what circumstances an attorney violates his duty of confidentiality and competence when using technology to
send or store confidential client information).
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I. THE BACKGROUND AND INTENT OF THE INADVERTENT
DISCLOSURE EVIDENCE RULE
Part of the impetus for the change to the Federal Rules of Evidence
regarding inadvertent disclosure was the dramatic increase in the cost of
litigation due to E-discovery.8 The volume of electronically stored information is staggering.9 For example, in one recent case 2.3 million documents were produced and privileges were claimed by the producing law
firm for an additional 30,000 documents.10 In the year 2011, it is estimated
that “the world will create, capture, or replicate nearly 1,800 exabytes
(EB) of information.”11 An exabyte is 1,152,921,504,606,846,976 bytes,
and one exabyte of storage “could contain 50,000 years’ worth of DVDquality video.”12 By one estimate, “all the printed material in the world
only takes up about five exabytes.”13

8. Jessica Wang, Nonwaiver Agreements after Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1845
(2009); see also Roland Bernier, Avoiding an E-discovery Odyssey, 36 N. KY. L. REV.
491, 495 (2009) (stating that Rule 502 “was passed, in part, to stem concerns that
productions of electronically stored information (ESI) were vulnerable to inadvertent
production of privileged material and a resulting waiver of privilege”); Barton &
Cross, supra note 2, at 8 (“This new rule addresses privilege waiver—arguably one of
the greatest risks and sources of costs associated with the incredible volume of information (primarily electronic) that is now being produced in litigation.”). The Amendments and the Committee Comments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
define “E-discovery” or “Electronically Stored Information” (ESI), but according to
Kenneth J. Withers, Managing Director of The Sedona Conference, “it is understood
to mean information created, manipulated, communicated, stored, and best utilized in
digital form, requiring the use of computer hardware and software.” See Kenneth J.
Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 173 (2006).
9. See The Honorable John M. Facciola & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Asserting
and Challenging Privilege Claims in Modern Litigation: The Facciola-Redgrave
Framework, 2009 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 36 (stating that there has been a tremendous
increase in the volume of documents requested and reviewed for discovery purposes).
10. Id. at 36–37 (citing In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789
(E.D. La. 2007).
11. Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to
Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 199 (2010) (citing JOHN F.
GANTZ, ET AL., THE DIVERSE AND EXPLODING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: AN UPDATED
FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2011 3 (2008), http://
www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/diverse-exploding-digital-universe.pdf.).
12. Exabyte, SEARCH STORAGE.COM, http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/s
Definition/0,,sid5_g ci212085,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
13. Exabyte, TECH TERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/Exabyte.
(lasted visited Feb. 26, 2010).
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The problems with computer-based discovery came to light in 1996,
and the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Rule Procedure (FRCP Advisory Committee) began intensive work on changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1999.14 Before Congress changed
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), the Supreme Court approved
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) (the “E-discovery Amendments”) effective in 2006.15 These changes to the FRCP were
the result of “nearly ten years of extensive study.”16
A. E-discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Rule 502 change to the FRE was necessary because of the
changes to the FRCP. Specifically, FRCP Rules 26(b)(5)(B) and
(f)(3)(D) provided procedural rules for the inadvertent production of
electronically stored information (ESI) and privileges.17 The FRCP did
not of course address the evidentiary privileges, as any change in that
area needed congressional action and could not be accomplished through
the FRCP Advisory Committee and adoption by the Supreme Court.18
The FRCP Advisory Committee purposely did not precisely define
“electronically stored information” when it suggested amendments to the
procedural rules.19 As originally enacted, Rule 34 referred to “docu-

14. E-Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Go into
Effect Today, K & L Gates (Dec.1, 2006), http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2006/12/
articles/news-updates/ediscovery-amendments-to-the-federal-rules-of-civil-procedurego-into-effect-today; Withers, supra note 8, at 191.
15. Damian Vargas, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 396 (2008). The 2006
changes to the FRCP were adopted by Supreme Court Order on April 12, 2006, and
transmitted to Congress by the Chief Justice on the same day and became effective
December 1, 2006. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FED. R.
CIV. P. XII (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/civil2009.pdf. The amendments affected Rules 5, 9, 14, 16, 24, 26, 33, 34, 37,
45, 50, and 65.1 and Form 35. Id. Note that further changes to the procedural rules
have been made in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Id.
16. Hopson v. City of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 233 (D. Md. 2005).
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B), (f)(3)(D).
18. See Withers, supra note 8, at 201 (“[T]he Committee wanted even more to
avoid creating a federal rule of privilege waiver, expressly or implicitly, in Rule
26(b)(5). Not only could that invade the territory of the Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee, but it could also be viewed as establishing or modifying substantive law
under the guise of adopting a procedural rule.”); see also ROTHSTEIN, HEDGES &
WIGGINS, supra note 3, at 15 (“Because substantive privilege (and waiver) rules are
beyond the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 Advisory Committee’s note (a); see also Carl G. Roberts, The 2006 Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2006

R
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ments” and “things.”20 In 1970, the rule was amended to include “data
compilations” due to the use of computers.21 According to the committee,
e-mails are a form of ESI and included within the terms “document” or
“data compilation.”22 Nevertheless, the committee found that “it has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of electronically stored
information, many dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of
a ‘document.’”23 However, instead of a limited or precise definition of
ESI, the committee opted for an expansive definition.24 The new procedural rules were “intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of
computer-based information, and flexible enough to encompass future
changes and developments.”25
The change in the form of information made a change in the procedural rules necessary, and the procedural rules changes made a change in
the evidentiary rules necessary. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides the following:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
....
(5) Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-Preparation
Materials.
....
(B) Information Produced. If information produced in
discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trialpreparation material, the party making the claim may notify any
party that received the information of the claim and the basis for
it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester,
or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must
not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved;
must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party
disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the
information to the court under seal for a determination of the
claim. The producing party must preserve the information until
the claim is resolved.26

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(f)(3)(C) and (D) provide the
following:

A.B.A. L. PRAC. MGMT. SEC., available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/
tch08061.shtml.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 Advisory Committee’s note (a).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
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(f) Conference of the Parties; Planning for Discovery.
....
(3) Discovery Plan. A discovery plan must state the parties’
views and proposals on:
....
(C) any issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in
which it should be produced;
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection
as trial-preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a
procedure to assert these claims after production—whether to ask
the court to include their agreement in an order.27

Rule 26(b)(5)(B) imposes what is called a “litigation hold” on discoverable material.28 The cat is already out of the bag, so to speak. The material
that is allegedly protected by privilege has already been provided to the
requesting party. This provision is also referred to as a “claw-back” provision.29 The FRCP Advisory Committee, however, makes it quite clear
that the rule “does not address whether the privilege or protection that is
asserted after production was waived by the production.”30
In addition to adhering to the requirements of Rule 16, referred to
as the “meet and confer” rule,31 section (f) of Rule 26 also mandates that
the parties to the action discuss, plan, and propose issues about discovery
of ESI and claims of privilege or protection.32 The committee cites the
“substantial costs” for the producing party and the time that might “sub-

27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C)–(D) (emphasis added).
28. Roberts, supra note 19; see also FAQ’s of E-Discovery, IN CAMERA (Fed.
Judges Ass’n Newsl.), Nov. 29, 2006, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/FAQEDisc.pdf/$file/FAQEDisc.pdf (providing answers to the ten most frequently asked questions regarding the 2006 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
29. See Vargas, supra note 15, at 412.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s note (b)(5); see also ROTHSTEIN,
HEDGES & WIGGINS, supra note 3, at 15. This is due to the fact that the Rules of Civil
Procedure did not and could not change the substantive rules of privilege and waiver.
The privilege rules are governed by the principles of common law (Rule 501). A
change in the Rules of Evidence was necessary to change the substantive law on privilege and waiver.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. The “meet and confer conference” requires the parties to
meet, and they must meet at least 21 days before the scheduling conference. Id.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 16; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C)–(D); see also. Sharon Nelson
& John Simek, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An ESI Primer, LAW PRAC.
MAG., A.B.A., available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_
home/law_practice_archive/lpm_magazine_articles_v32_is8_an7.html (last visited
June 15, 2011).
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stantially delay access” for the requesting party when working with ESI.33
It also mentions the new terminology that has emerged in electronic discovery, namely “quick peek” protocol agreements, “claw-back agreements,” and “metadata.”34
A “quick peek” agreement is an arrangement where the “parties
agree to an ‘open file’ review of each other’s data collections prior to
formal discovery, reserving all rights to assert privilege while responding
to the actual document request.”35 A “claw-back” agreement is one in
which “counsel on both sides agree to surrender any documents they receive from the other if a privilege claim is asserted in a timely manner
after production, and if there is a disagreement, to place the document on
a privilege log for review by the judge at an appropriate time.”36 “Socalled ‘claw back’ provisions ‘essentially undo a document production’
and allow the return of documents that a party belatedly determines are
protected by the attorney–client privilege or work product immunity.”37
Metadata is essentially the history and context of ESI.38 Metadata has
been referred to as the “electronic equivalent of DNA, ballistics, and fingerprint evidence.”39 The FRCP Advisory Committee noted that the
metadata “is usually not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a
screen image.”40 Again, the committee made it quite clear that whether
the privilege is waived under any of these circumstances is a determination for the courts and is not something addressed by the procedural rule

33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s note (f).
34. Id.
35. Withers, supra note 8, at 202.
36. Id.; see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (defining a claw-back agreement as an agreement “that allow[s] the parties to
forego privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to return inadvertently
produced privileged documents”).
37. Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL
2949582, at*3 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (quoting United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc.,
No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *2 n.6 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009)).
38. Roberts, supra note 19; see also Vargas, supra note 15, at 399 (“When a digital document is created, modified, or transmitted, new data associated with the document is also created. This new data, called metadata, is stored in the associated
electronic document and is typically hidden. However, extracting metadata will create
a new electronic document of its own.”).
39. FAQ’s of E-Discovery, supra note 28 (quoting Craig Ball, “I Never
Metadata I Didn’t Like” (January 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Craig
Ball)).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s note (f).

R
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changes.41 Any change in evidentiary privilege rules was to be addressed
elsewhere.
The change in the FRCP did not affect the issue of actual waiver of
privilege because the “Rules Enabling Act dictates that the Supreme
Court can only promulgate rules prescribing the practice and procedure
of federal courts,” but may not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”42—this may only be done by Congress.43
B. History of Federal Rule of Evidence 502
In April 2004, work commenced on the new FRE 502.44 Work in
earnest began on the project in January of 2006, when then-Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee James Sensenbrenner sent a letter to
Ralph Mecham, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, in which he requested that they begin work on what would later
become Rule 502.45 Chairman Sensenbrenner suggested the rule address
three specific areas, which he listed as the following:
1. [P]rotect against the forfeiture of privilege where a disclosure in
discovery is the result of an innocent mistake;
2. [P]ermit parties, and courts, to protect against the consequences
of waiver by permitting disclosures of privileged information between the parties to a litigation; and

41. Id. “Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privilege or protection
that is asserted after production was waived by the production. The courts have developed principles to determine whether, and under what circumstances, waiver results
from inadvertent production of privileged or protected information.” Id. Advisory
Committee’s note (b)(5).
42. Wang, supra note 8, at 1845 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006)).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b). Section 2074(b) provides that “(a)ny such rule creating,
abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege” must be “approved by [an] Act of
Congress.” Id.
44. See Timeline—Federal Rule of Evidence 502, FEDERALEVIDENCE.COM, http://
federalevidence.com/node/288 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); see also President Bush
Signs into Law S. 2450, a Bill Adding New Rule 502 to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
EDISCOVERYLAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/articles/federalrules-amendments (providing a brief overview of the history of Rule 502).
45. Understanding New FRE 502 (Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Doctrine), 5 Fed. Evid. R. 1433, 1455 (Oct. 2008), available at http://federalevidence
.com/pdf/2008/FRE502/502Excerpt.pdf (citing Letter from James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
former Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Ralph Mecham, Dir. of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 23, 2006)) [hereinafter Understanding New FRE
502]; see also Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of
Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C.
L. REV. 211, 246 (2006) (providing excerpts of Representative Sensenbrenner’s letter
to Ralph Mecham).

R
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3. [A]llow persons and entities to cooperate with government
agencies by turning over privileged information without waiving
all privileges as to other parties in subsequent litigation.46

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts responded to Chairman
Sensenbrenner and indicated that it had referred the project to the U.S.
Judicial Conference, specifically to the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee (FRE Advisory Committee).47 By April 2006, the FRE
Advisory Committee produced a draft rule.48
The FRE Advisory Committee purposely drafted the rule broadly,
and indicated that it could cut back the rule, if necessary.49 The committee
did in fact decide to “cut back on some of its more dramatic provisions.”50
Specifically, the committee believed it needed to provide “for certain situations in which a waiver will not be found, even though it otherwise
might be found under common law.”51 Additionally, the committee indicated it would “especially appreciate public input” on the “selective
waiver” provision.52 The selective waiver provision was later included in
the revised version of Proposed Rule 502, and it specified that if a disclosure was “made to a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority” there would be no
waiver to “non-governmental persons or entities.”53 This is what Chairman Sensenbrenner requested in his third bullet point above. Finally, the
committee voiced concern about a federal rule affecting state proceedings
in any way.54
In August 2006, the rule was published for public comment.55 The
FRE Advisory Committee “received more than 70 public comments and
heard testimony from 20 witnesses at two public hearings.”56 The committee ultimately decided against inclusion of the “selective waiver” provision.57 “Unlike inadvertent waivers, which raise the costs and burdens of
the discovery phase of litigation, an area of great concern to the rules
committees, the selective waiver provision addresses policy matters, prin46.
47.
48.
Waiver”
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Broun & Capra, supra note 45, at 246.
Understanding New FRE 502, supra note 45, at 1455.
See id. The draft rule was published after the “Mini-Conference on Privilege
held at Fordham University School of Law. Id.
Broun & Capra, supra note 45, at 247.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250–51.
Id. at 249.
Understanding New FRE 502, supra note 45, at 1455.
S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 4 (2008).
Id.

R
R

R

R
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cipally the effectiveness of government investigations, which are largely
outside the competence and jurisdiction of the rules committees.”58 Approximately one year after the publication of the proposed rule, it was
sent to members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.59
On December 11, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced Senate Bill 2450, “A
Bill to Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to Address the Waiver of
the Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine.”60 On July
24, 2008, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduced an identical bill to the House of Representatives.61 Both bills were referred to
their respective Judiciary Committees and were reported without amendment.62 The Senate bill “attracted widespread support from major legal
organizations representing stakeholders on all sides of modern litigation,”
such as the American Bar Association, the American College of Trial
Lawyers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.63
The Senate Judiciary Committee referred to the privilege law as
“outdated.”64 The committee report contained the following observation:
Currently, the inadvertent production of even a single privileged
document puts the producing party at significant risk. If a privileged document is disclosed, a court may find that the waiver applies not only to that specific document and case but to all other
documents and cases concerning the same subject matter. Furthermore, the privilege can be waived even if the party took reasonable steps to avoid disclosing it.65

The committee emphasized the effect e-mail and other “electronic media” had on the time needed to review documents and the overall cost of
58. Id.
59. Understanding New FRE 502, supra note 45, at 1455.
60. See id. at 1456; S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 1 (2008). Senate Bill 2450 became
Pubic Law No. 110-322. Understanding New FRE 502, supra note 45, at 1256. Senator
Arlen Specter (R-PA (now D-PA)) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) joined
Chairman Leahy and co-sponsored this bill. S. 2450: A bill to amend the Federal Rules
of Evidence to address the waiver of the attorney-client., GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2450 (last visited June 16, 2010).
61. See Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress H.R. 6610, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR06610:@@@L&summ2=
m& (last visited June 16, 2011).
62. See id.; Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress S. 2450, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN02450:@@@L&summ2
=m (last visited June 16, 2011).
63. S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 3 (2008).
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 2.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX102.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 11

7-NOV-11

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502

14:03

203

litigation.66 Further, it indicated that “the fear of waiver also leads to extravagant claims of privilege” and “the costs of privilege review are often
wholly disproportionate to the overall cost of the case.”67
Senator Arlen Specter indicated in his floor statement that the rule
alleviates the burdens of modern discovery in two ways. First, it “protects
against undue forfeiture of attorney–client privilege and work product
protections when privileged communications are inadvertently produced,” and second, “it permits parties and courts to protect against the
consequences of waiver by permitting limited disclosure of privileged information between the parties to litigation.”68 The bill was passed by the
Senate on February 27, 2008,69 and passed in the House of Representatives on September 8, 2008.70 Then-President George W. Bush signed the
bill on September 19, 2008, effective as of that date.71
FRE 502 in its final form states the following:
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver.
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out,
to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.
(a) DISCLOSURE MADE IN A FEDERAL PROCEEDING OR TO A FEDERAL OFFICE OR AGENCY; SCOPE OF
A WAIVER.—When the disclosure is made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal or State proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or
information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE.—When made in a
Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, the disclosure
does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 153 CONG. REC. S15143 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007) (statement of Senator Arlen Specter).
69. 154 CONG. REC. S1318–19 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008).
70. Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3538 (2008).
71. Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3538 (2008); Wang, supra note 8, at 1835.
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(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
(c) DISCLOSURE MADE IN A STATE PROCEEDING.—When the disclosure is made in a State proceeding and is
not the subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal proceeding if the
disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been
made in a Federal proceeding; or
(2) is not a waiver under the law of the State where the
disclosure occurred.
(d) CONTROLLING EFFECT OF A COURT ORDER.—
A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not
waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before
the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in
any other Federal or State proceeding.
(e) CONTROLLING EFFECT OF A PARTY AGREEMENT.—An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal
proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless
it is incorporated into a court order.
(f) CONTROLLING EFFECT OF THIS RULE.—Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to State proceedings
and to Federal court-annexed and Federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And
notwith- standing [sic] Rule 501, this rule applies even if State law
provides the rule of decision.
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this rule:
(1) “attorney-client privilege” means the protection
that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and
(2) “work-product protection” means the protection
that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible
equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.72

The notes of the FRE Advisory Committee indicate that the rule was a
response to “widespread complaint[s] that litigation costs necessary to
protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have
become prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected communications or information.”73 Additionally, the rule “resolves
some longstanding disputes in the courts about the effect of certain dis-

72.
73.

Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537–38 (2008).
FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note.
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closures of communications or information protected by the attorney-client privilege or as work product.”74 To properly understand the waiver
issue, it is first necessary to understand the attorney–client privilege and
the attorney-work-product doctrine.
C. Attorney–Client Privilege and the Attorney-Work-Product Doctrine
Certain communications between an attorney and a client are protected from disclosure “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”75 In our
system of justice, we believe that only when the communication is protected from public disclosure will clients feel fully free to discuss their
legal issues with their attorneys. When lawyers are armed with all of the
facts and circumstances, they will be able to zealously represent their client.76 The privilege belongs to the client, not to the attorney.77 Attorneys
are expected to assert the privilege on behalf of their client.78 For the
privilege to apply, the communication must be made in confidence, and
the client must be seeking legal advice.79
The work product doctrine, on the other hand, is held by both the
attorney and the client, and either (or both) may claim its protection.80 A
waiver by either the attorney or the client does not waive the protection
with respect to the other.81 The work product doctrine was established by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947.82 In Hickman, during pretrial discovery, one party requested the notes of witness interviews
prepared by the other party’s attorney.83 The Court held that the notes
were protected from discovery because they were prepared by the attorney in anticipation of litigation.84 The Court reasoned that if one party
was given full access to the other party’s documents, information, and
thoughts prepared in anticipation of litigation “[t]he effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing.”85 Attorneys would be unlikely to document any of their work if opposing counsel could acquire the notes, doc74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
See id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F. 3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See Sandra T.E., 600 F. 3d at 618.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 F. 3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 511.
Id.
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uments, or things simply by asking for the material via a discovery
request.86 Rather, courts have recognized “the need to protect trial counsel’s thoughts.”87 This doctrine has been partially codified in FRCP
26(b)(3), which provides the following: “Documents and Tangible Things.
Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that
are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).”88 The term “in anticipation of
litigation” is defined by most circuit courts by answering the question of
whether the document or thing was created “because of” the anticipated
litigation.89
In the event a party waives the attorney–client privilege or work
product protection, “[t]he widely applied standard for determining the
scope of a waiver . . . is that the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.”90 It should be noted that “a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not the same for waiver of work
product protection.”91 Voluntary disclosure waives the attorney–client
privilege, but it does not necessarily waive work product protection.92 The
attorney–client privilege is more easily waived than work product
protection.93
The FRE Advisory Committee “concluded that if there were a way
to produce documents in discovery without risking subject matter waiver,
the discovery process could be made much less expensive.”94 The committee believed that court decisions on the effect of inadvertent disclosure

86. Id.
87. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F. 3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Deloitte, 610 F. 3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The
Fifth Circuit “requires that anticipation of litigation be the ‘primary motivating purpose’ behind the document’s creation.” Id. (citing United States v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982)).
90. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F. 3d at 1372 (quoting Fort James Corp. v.
Solo Cup Corp., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
91. Hopson v. City of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 234 n.8 (D. Md. 2005).
92. Deloitte, 610 F. 3d at 139.
93. Hopson, 232 F.R.D at 233 n.8 (citing Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Twin
Laboratories, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463–64 (D. Md. 1998); In re Martin Marietta
Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623–24 (4th Cir. 1988)).
94. See Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Comm. Chair on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Member of the
Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Hill_Letter_re_EV_502.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
Lee H. Rosenthal].
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were “far from consistent or certain.”95 One of the purposes of Rule 502
was to provide uniform rules applicable when a party inadvertently disclosed a document.96
D. Purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 502
The FRE Advisory Committee relies heavily on the Hopson v. City
of Baltimore case, written by U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm.97
This opinion contains an exhaustive history of inadvertent waiver issues
and is law review-esque in its detail. The Fourth Circuit, to which Judge
Grimm’s district is bound, had not yet considered the inadvertent disclosure issue.98 In Hopson, Judge Grimm illustrated the disparate treatment
different courts had given to waiver issues.99 He cited the varying treatment given to counsel “non-waiver” agreements.100 He also outlined the
three approaches courts had taken concerning whether privileges were
waived by inadvertent disclosure, the “strict accountability” approach,
the “lenient” approach, and the “balancing test” approach.101
Courts following the strict accountability approach held that “inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery automatically constituted a subject matter waiver” notwithstanding protections taken to avoid
such a disclosure.102 Under the lenient approach, courts excuse all inadvertent disclosures, provided the disclosure was truly inadvertent and not
intentional.103 The majority of courts followed the balancing test approach
(deemed the “middle ground” by the FRE Advisory Committee).104 According to the committee, under this approach the inadvertent disclosure
constitutes a waiver only if “the disclosing party acted carelessly in disclosing the communication or information and failed to request its return
in a timely manner.”105 By incorporating this “middle ground” approach
in the rule, Congress attempted to legislate uniformity throughout the
country for the law on inadvertent disclosure.

95. See id.
96. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note.
97. See id.; Hopson, 232 F.R.D at 233 n.8.
98. Hopson, 232 F.R.D at 234.
99. Id. at 232.
100. Id. at 235.
101. Id. at 235–36.
102. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (a). The committee cited In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), as an example of the strict accountability approach and specifically rejected it. Id.
103. Id. at Advisory Committee’s note (b).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Congress also specified the treatment for disclosures made in a federal proceeding or to a federal agency, disclosures made in state proceedings, and the effect of a court order and private agreement between
parties to an action.106 Ideally, litigants would no longer need to be concerned about the particular law within their particular jurisdiction—precisely the problem outlined by Judge Grimm.107 However, both the FRE
Advisory Committee and Congress indicated that no change was intended with respect to the actual substantive law of the attorney–client
privilege or work product protection.108 This was to remain as it was
under common law and by court decisions.109
In a federal proceeding or when a disclosure is made to a federal
office or agency, there is no longer a blanket subject-matter waiver of the
attorney–client privilege or work product doctrine if the waiver was unintentional, unless the disclosing party attempted to use the inadvertently
disclosed material as both a sword and a shield.110 Therefore, a party may
not advertently disclose a protected document and later claim an inadvertent disclosure when the document is used by the opposing party. Thus,
the “subject matter waiver is limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner.”111
Subsection (c) of the rule addresses when disclosures are made in
state court proceedings. The rule differentiates between a waiver when a
state court order is issued and a waiver when there is no state court order.112 If there is no state court order, then there is no waiver in the fed-

106. FED. R. EVID. 502 (a), (c), (e).
107. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D at 236.
108. Understanding New FRE 502, supra note 45, at 1457.
109. Id.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a)(2)–(3) (specifying that waiver will apply if the disclosure is unintentional and the “disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter” and the situation “ought in fairness to be
considered together”); Gareth T. Evans & Farrah Pepper, Federal Rule of Evidence
502: Getting to Know an Important E-Discovery Tool, ORANGE COUNTY LAW. MAG.
Nov. 2009, Vol. 51, No. 11, at 10, 11 (stating a party uses the inadvertent disclosure as
shield and sword when the party “would gain an unfair advantage by intentionally and
selectively producing favorable privileged documents while simultaneously seeking to
protect damaging documents on the same subject”); see also Starsight Telecast, Inc. v.
Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“In general, a party’s
voluntary disclosure of one or more privileged communications between the party
and his attorney waives the privilege as to all communications between the party and
his attorney on the same subject”) (citing Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp.
136, 156 (D. Del. 1977)).
111. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (a).
112. FED. R. EVID. 502(c).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX102.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 17

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502

7-NOV-11

14:03

209

eral proceeding if there would not have been a waiver under the Federal
Rule (if made in a federal proceeding), or the law of the state where the
disclosure provides there would be no waiver.113 The rule purposely does
not address when the waiver is the subject of a state court order, “as that
question is covered both by statutory law and principles of federalism and
comity.”114
If a party wants to be fully protected in the event of an inadvertent
disclosure, he or she should request a court order. If a federal court issues
an order that “the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure,”
then the material is protected in any other federal or state proceeding.115
This is a very broad provision and applies even to individuals and entities
that are not a party to the litigation for which the order is issued.116 Note
that there is no reasonableness standard in this instance, so it applies even
if the disclosing party was careless, reckless, or negligent in providing the
material to the requesting party, as long as a court order had been issued.117 Additionally, the court order may incorporate a “claw-back” or
“quick peek” agreement made by the parties, or the court may even order it in the absence of a specific party agreement.118 Thus the rule allows
a court to issue an order at the parties’ request or even sua sponte.119
Finally, the rule was changed to provide uniformity and predictability120 and it specifies that parties may enter into an agreement without a
court order.121 These “claw-back” or “quick peek” agreements will be enforced against either party to the agreement by the court.122 However,
these agreements are not enforceable by the court against any non-party
to the agreement.123 Rule 502 was designed to give attorneys much
113. Id.
114. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (c).
115. Id. at 502(d).
116. Evans & Pepper, supra note 110, at 11.
117. See id.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (d) (“Under the rule, a
confidentiality order is enforceable whether or not it memorializes an agreement
among the parties to the litigation. [The] party agreement should not be a condition of
enforceability of a federal court’s order.”); see, e.g., Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP,
No. No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at*5–7 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (imposing a claw-back agreement despite the objection of one of the parties).
119. Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal
Rule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived Up to Its Potential? 17 RICH. J.L & TECH. 8, ¶102
(2011), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article8.pdf (“[P]ursuant to Rule
502(d), the court may issue an order—at the parties’ behest or sua sponte. . . .”)
120. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note.
121. FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
122. Id.
123. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (e).
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needed predictability and the rules throughout the country were to be
uniform.
II. CASES AND RULINGS IN THE POST-FRE 502 WORLD
A. Setting the Stage for Post-502 Rulings
There are approximately eighty reported cases and rulings that have
been issued since Congress passed FRE 502, from which some trends
emerge. In making a fact-based inquiry in each case, courts are more forgiving if massive amounts of material are involved. If attorneys engage
commercial third parties to do document reviews, courts tend to find the
disclosures inadvertent. However, as noted by one group of commentators, there are numerous examples of inconsistencies in courts’ application of Rule 502.124
After the bill proposing Rule 502 was passed in the Senate, but
before the bill had passed in the House, Judge Grimm, the magistrate
judge and author of Hopson, issued another ruling on inadvertent disclosure, Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe.125 The plaintiff, Victor Stanley, filed
a motion seeking a ruling that 165 documents were properly discoverable.126 The defendant, Creative Pipe, argued that the documents were protected by the attorney–client privilege and/or the work product doctrine,
and that protection had not been waived.127 Judge Grimm found the documents were not protected because Creative Pipe had waived the privilege/protection.128 Creative Pipe provided some documents to Victor
Stanley and once Victor Stanley noticed that some of the documents were
potentially privileged, it informed Creative Pipe.129 Interestingly, Creative
Pipe had earlier “abandoned their efforts to obtain a claw back agreement and committed to undertaking an individualized document review.”130 Judge Grimm used a five-factor balancing test and used the
“intermediate test” to determine if the privilege/protection had been

124. Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119, ¶2 (“[C]ourts have not interpreted Rule 502 with sufficient consistency in reported decisions to enable practitioners and their clients to predict how they will fare if they attempt to take advantage
of the rule. . . .”).
125. 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008) (opinion issued May 29, 2008, the Senate
passed Rule 502 on Feb. 27, 2008, and the House passed the bill on Sept. 8, 2008).
126. Id. at 253.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 253–54.
129. Id. at 255.
130. Id.
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waived.131 The five-factor balancing test he used comprises these items:
“(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent
disclosure; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the
disclosures; (4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and
(5) overriding interests in justice.”132
The FRE Advisory Committee noted other, similar factors to determine whether an inadvertent disclosure was a waiver.133 The committee
cited Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103,
105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323,
332 (N.D. Cal. 1985) as the origins of the “multifactor” test.134 The multifactor test comprises these items: “(1) the reasonableness of precautions
taken; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of discovery;
(4) the extent of disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness.”135
The committee noted that the rule did not in fact codify any test, “because it is really a set of non-determinative guidelines that vary from case
to case.”136 The committee also mentioned two other factors—the number
of documents to be reviewed, and the time constraints for production.137
However, it did specify that the rule should be “flexible enough to accommodate any of those listed factors.”138

131. Id. at 259. Judge Grimm cited McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179
F.R.D. 163, 167 (D. Md. 1998), as the origin of this five-factor test. Id.
132. Id. Victor Stanley later proved just how important it is to respond to ESI
requests in a timely fashion. In a subsequent ruling, Judge Grimm imposed a prison
term on the defendant for willful spoliation of ESI, not to exceed two years “unless
and until he pays . . . [the] [p]laintiff the attorney’s fees and costs . . . awarded
. . . as the prevailing party.” Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley
II), 269 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Md. 2010). However, Judge Grimm’s order was later
modified by District Court Judge Garbis, who ruled that the defendant should not be
incarcerated until he failed to comply with Judge Grimm’s payment order. Melissa
DeHonney, District Judge Overturns Part of Victor Stanley II Ordering Immediate Jail
Time to a Defendant Based on a Possible Future Failure to Pay Spoliation Sanctions,
GIBBONS E-DISCOVERY LAW ALERT (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.ediscoverylawalert
.com/tags/victor-stanley-ii. In January 2011, the defendant was ordered to pay costs
and fees to the plaintiff in the total amount of $1,049,850. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley III), Civil No. MJG.-06-2662 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.applieddiscovery.com/ksc_assets/blog/victor-stanley-fee-award
.pdf.
133. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (b).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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B. Post-Rule 502 Cases: 2008
The first reported ruling that applied new Rule 502 was Rhoads Industries v. Building Materials Corp. of America.139 Interestingly, District
Court Judge Baylson, the author of Rhoads, was a non-voting member of
the FRE Advisory Committee for the new rule.140 Obviously Judge Baylson has a great familiarity with ESI and his work on the rule would not
preclude his consideration of the case. In this case, plaintiff Rhoads Industries produced over 800 privileged documents during the discovery
phase of the litigation.141 First, Judge Baylson determined that of the 800
documents, 120 had not been listed on any privilege log.142 He ordered
Rhoads to produce those documents to the defendant (in actuality these
had already been produced, but had been segregated and held by the
defendant).143
The issue in the case was whether the disclosure of the remaining
documents was inadvertent under Rule 502(b).144 Judge Baylson initially
looked to the actual requirements of Rule 502(b)—that the disclosure be
inadvertent, that the holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, and that the holder of the privilege promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error.145 Next he quickly turned to “a widely
cited case setting an appropriate standard,” Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. McCulloch.146 The factors in Fidelity are the same as those cited
in Victor Stanley.147 Although Judge Baylson found that four of the five
Fidelity factors favored the defendant, he determined that there was no
waiver of the privilege by Rhoads.148 He relied heavily on the fifth factor,
the “overriding interests of justice,” and noted that “the loss of privilege

139. 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note
119, ¶52. This ruling was later clarified by Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of
Am., 254 F.R.D. 238 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
140. Id. at 218 n.1.
141. Id. at 223.
142. Id. at 223–24; see also Colleen M. Kenney & Marc E. Raven, First Cases
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 502 Reflect Variety of Approaches, Underscore Importance of “Clawback” Orders, BLOOMBERG FIN. (May 2009) reprinted by Sidley
Austin, LLP, available at http://www.sidley.com/Publications/?Archive=1 (click on article listed middle of the page) (last visited June 16, 2011) (providing the history and
purpose of Rule 502 and outlining some of the first cases that applied the rule).
143. Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 218, 224.
144. See id. at 216.
145. Id. at 218–19 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(1)–(3)).
146. Id. at 219.
147. Id. at 220.
148. Id. at 226–27.
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would be highly prejudicial” to Rhoads.149 Judge Baylson took a bit of a
swipe at Judge Grimm and termed his analysis an
application of hindsight, which should not carry much weight, if
any, because no matter what methods an attorney employed, an
after-the-fact critique can always conclude that a better job could
have been done . . . the fifth factor, the interest of justice,
strongly favors Rhoads. Loss of the attorney-client privilege in a
high-stakes, hard-fought litigation is a severe sanction and can
lead to serious prejudice.150

Another case decided soon after the passage of FRE 502 was
Laethem Equipment Co. v. Deere & Co.151 Magistrate Judge Komives
looked only at the three listed requirements of FRE 502(b) and concluded that all of the elements were met.152 He denied the defendant’s
request for an order that the privilege was waived.153 He dismissed any
alleged discovery abuses, as he determined they were not relevant under
the rule.154 The judge was apparently impressed by the speed by which the
plaintiff took reasonable steps to rectify the error, one of the conditions
of the rule.155 The judges in both the Rhoads and Laethem cases certainly
took to heart the FRE Advisory Committee’s recommendation that

149. Id. at 225; see also Kenney & Raven, supra note 142, at 2 (“The [Rhoads]
court thus held that no waiver had occurred, even though four of the five factors
weighed in favor of such a finding.”).
150. Id. at 226–27. For an excellent article comparing Rhoads to Victor Stanley,
see Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Mistakes Happen, NAT’L LAW J., Jan. 19,
2009, available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUp
load500/5933/Solovy_Byman_MistakesHappen.pdf. In a later case, a district judge for
the Western District of Pennsylvania stated that, “[p]ost-amendment, district courts in
the Third Circuit have continued to consider” the five Rhoads factors relevant to the
issue of inadvertent disclosure. Rhoades v. YWCA Ass’n of Greater Pittsburgh, No.
09-261, 2009 WL 3319820, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2009).
151. No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL 4997932 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2008).
152. Id. at *9.
153. Id. at *8.
154. Id.; see also Has Federal Rule of Evidence 502 Healed the Heartache of Inadvertent Disclosure? KROLL ONTRACK (June 2009), http://www.krollontrack.com/news
letters/clu_0609.html#2 (“[T]he rule is intended to focus on the disclosure of privileged information not discovery abuses.”) (citation omitted).
155. Laethem Equip. Co., No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL 4997932, at *8–9; see also
Kenney & Raven, supra note 142, at 2 (“The [Laethem] court noted that plaintiffs
lodged an objection immediately during the deposition in which the disclosed documents were used, sent a follow-up letter the same day, and offered repeated objections at later depositions.”).

R
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courts should take a flexible approach to FRE 502.156 In Rhoads, Judge
Baylson found that one of the five “reasonableness” factors was so important that it virtually took over the other factors, and in Laethem,
Judge Komives did not conduct a “five-factor” analysis but instead relied
completely on the test contained in FRE 502(b).157
Other courts have not been as flexible, as is illustrated by Relion,
Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., which was decided by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon.158 Relion sought the return of two emails it maintained were privileged.159 The magistrate judge stated that it
would “find the privilege preserved if the privilege holder has made efforts ‘reasonably designed’ to protect and preserve the privilege; conversely, the court deems the privilege waived if the privilege holder fails
to pursue all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the
privileged matter.”160 Although the judge cited Rule 502, he seems to
have relied exclusively on a pre-Rule 502 Ninth Circuit case in reaching
his decision, which was that Relion waived the privilege.161 One odd element in Relion is that the parties had a protective order in place in the
litigation, although it was not subject to much discussion in the
decision.162
Alcon Manufacturing Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. was another case decided
just after Rule 502 was passed.163 In Alcon, only one document was at
issue—“Deposition Exhibit 71.”164 The parties to the case did, in fact have
a protective order from the court concerning the privileged document.165
Nevertheless, the defendant claimed the protective order no longer applied because the document had been made part of a deposition record.166
The court quickly dismissed this argument and indicated that the protective order applied despite the use of the document in the deposition.167
The court ultimately ordered the document returned, because the plaintiff had followed the specifications of the protective order (requiring

156. Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 220–21
(E.D. Pa. 2008); Laethem Equip. Co., No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL 4997932, at *9–10.
157. See Kenney & Raven, supra note 142, at 3.
158. No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008).
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *2–4. The court relied on United States v. de la Jara, 973 F. 2d 746 (9th
Cir. 1992).
162. Id. at *2.
163. No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 5070465 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *3.
167. Id.
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prompt remedial action), and it was compliant with the intent of Rule
502.168 The judge stated the following:
Perhaps the situation at hand could have been avoided had Plaintiffs’ counsel meticulously double or triple-checked all disclosures
against the privilege log prior to any disclosures. However, this
type of expensive, painstaking review is precisely what new Evidence Rule 502 and the protective order in this case were designed to avoid.169

The critical factor in Alcon is that the plaintiff followed the terms of the
protective order.170 Comparing the above four cases, one quickly concludes that different judges take different approaches yet all seem to look
at the “big picture” of reasonableness.
One other issue that was determined by a court in 2008 was the
question of whether a protective order may cover an entire document or
only that portion of a document that is protected by a privilege or doctrine.171 Magistrate Judge Baker found that the entire document should
be covered by the protective order and stated that “an entire document
may be marked as ‘confidential’ if done so in good faith, in light of the
costs and burdens that might be required by a more discerning review of
voluminous production.”172
C. Post-Rule 502 Selected Cases and Rulings: 2009
Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC173 has received a
significant amount of commentary since it was decided by the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in August 2009.174 In Coburn,
the Coburn Group brought a breach of oral contract claim against White-

168. Id. at *6.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Schaefer, supra note 11, at 222 (“Citing FRE 502(d) and setting
out the terms of the order, the [Alcon] court determined that the plaintiff had complied with the order, justifying a conclusion that the privilege was not waived.”).
171. Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No.
1:07-cv-997-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 4545310, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2008).
172. Id. at *6.
173. 640 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
174. See, e.g., Case Highlights Inadvertent Disclosure Standards Under FRE
502(b), FED. EVID. REV. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2009/
september/case-highlights-inadvertent-disclosure-standards-under-fre-502b; Robert
D. Owen & Melissa H. Cozart, FRE 502: One Year Later, L. TECH. NEWS, (Oct. 13,
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=
1202434493885.
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cap Advisors.175 During discovery, Whitecap presented to one of its attorneys, Michael Hultquist, a computer hard drive that contained
approximately “72,000 pages of potentially responsive documents.”176 Mr.
Hultquist assigned two seasoned paralegals to review the documents, and
he implemented a protocol for them to follow during their review.177 After the review, Whitecap provided approximately 40,000 documents to
Coburn.178 The production included a half-page-long e-mail that was the
subject of the motion to return the document.179 Magistrate Judge Brown
determined that the e-mail was protected by the work product doctrine,
following which she turned her attention to the application of Rule 502.180
The judge used Heriot v. Byrne (see below) as an example of a case in
which the determination of whether a disclosure was “inadvertent”
(under 502(b)(1)) was too complex.181 She favored a much simpler approach “essentially asking whether the party intended a privileged or
work product protected document to be produced or whether the production was a mistake.”182 Next, she discussed the other two requirements of
Rule 502, sections (b)(2) (reasonable steps to prevent disclosure) and
(b)(3) (reasonable steps to rectify the error).183 In her analysis under subsection (b)(2), the judge respectfully disagreed with the judge in Relion,184
and she stated the following:
The standard of Rule 502(b)(2) is not “all reasonable means,” it is
“reasonable steps to prevent disclosure.” Furthermore, the decision appears to be contrary to the view of the Judicial Conference
Rules Committee that Rule 502 “does not require the producing
party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether
any protected communication or information has been produced
by mistake.”185

175. Coburn, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1035, 1039. One of the interesting aspects of the case is that Coburn
argued that assigning the document review task to paralegals was in and of itself unreasonable. Id. at 1039. The court did not agree. Id. at 1040.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1035.
180. Id. at 1037.
181. Id. at 1038.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1039–41.
184. Id. at 1040.
185. Id. (quoting Rule 502 FRE Advisory Committee explanatory note (2007)).
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Judge Brown ultimately determined that there was no waiver of work
product protection, that the e-mail was protected against disclosure.186 Interestingly, another magistrate judge in the very same district, later referred to and used the analysis set forth in Heriot.187 This illustrates the
fact that each case is decided based upon each judge’s particular analysis.
The sought after uniformity may not be achieved under their approach.
In Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., the court found the waiver was not inadvertent
under Rule 502 despite the fact that it was one e-mail out of 5,500 documents produced (with “several thousand more” documents reviewed)
and a protective order had been signed by the parties.188 The magistrate
judge in Comrie found a lack of any evidence to support that the disclosure was inadvertent or that the disclosing party had taken reasonable
steps to prevent disclosure.189
A Kansas case, Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC,190 has also received
some attention due to the fact that the court dismissed one party’s offer
to enter into a waiver agreement, finding that a claw-back agreement
would have been ineffectual absent a party’s reasonable steps taken to
prevent disclosure of privileged material.191 Hugo Spieker and others
were suing Quest Cherokee (Quest) for the payment of royalties they
maintained Quest owed them on oil and gas leases.192 Spieker served discovery, and Quest objected to the production of certain ESI.193 Quest
maintained during an earlier discovery hearing that it would cost between

186. Id. at 1043.
187. Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., No. 08 C 3060, 2009 WL 4403364, at * 2 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 30, 2009).
188. Id. at *1, *3.
189. Id. at *2.
190. No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009).
191. See, e.g., H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Kansas Case Casts
Doubt on Usefulness of Rule 502, 242 N.Y. L.J. (2009), available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202435048078&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (discussing how the Spieker decision seems be at odds and with the purpose and history of
Rule 502); Amy Longo, Decision Rejects Use of “Quick Peek” Agreements Under Federal Rule of Evidence 502, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Aug. 24, 2009) http://
www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?pub=852 (arguing that if Spieker were
followed it could “limit the extent to which Rule 502 enables parties to achieve cost
savings in privilege reviews”); Rule 502—Applying The Inadvertent Disclosure Test to
E-Discovery, MCGUIRE WOODS (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/
news-resources/item.asp?item=4211 (“As the [Spieker] magistrate judge . . . noted,
Rule 502 only protects against inadvertent disclosure where the producing party establishes that reasonable steps were taken to prevent such disclosure, and it is inadequate to turn over all materials subject to a non-waiver agreement.”).
192. Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892, at *1.
193. Id.
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$82,000 and $375,000 to comply, and that Spieker had not shown the ESI
was even relevant to the issues in the case.194 During the second hearing
(to which this ruling applied), Magistrate Judge Humphreys found that
Spieker proved the relevance of the requested documents and she ordered that Quest produce them.195
Judge Humphreys seemingly erred when he described the plaintiffs’
proposed claw-back agreement as part of its motion to compel production as not helpful absent the plaintiff taking reasonable steps to prevent
the disclosure of privileged material.196 Judge Humphreys seems to find
that the reasonableness requirements of 502(b) apply to claw-back agreements under 502(d) or (e).197 In actuality, each section of 502 should and
does stand on its own.198 Judge Humphreys stated the following about the
proposed claw-back agreement:
Plaintiffs suggest that defendant can minimize its costs by turning
over a copy of all of defendant’s ESI in native format with an
agreement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5)(B) and Fed.R.Evid. 502
that defendant has not waived the attorney client privilege. The
difficulty with this argument is that Rule 502(b) preserves the
privilege if “the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” of the privileged material. Simply
turning over all ESI materials does not show that a party has
taken “the reasonable steps” to prevent disclosure of its privileged
materials and plaintiffs’ proposal is flawed.199

This statement has understandably made practitioners question the
utility of a claw-back agreement under 502(d) or (e).200 Other courts will
be unlikely to follow Judge Humphreys’ reasoning due to basic statutory
194. Id. An earlier motion was denied without prejudice because of the high cost
it would impose on Quest and Spieker failed to show the relevance of the ESI. Id.
195. Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892, at *2, *5.
196. See id. at *3 (“The difficulty with this [using such an agreement] is that Rule
502(b) preserves the privilege if ‘the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure’ of the privileged material.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
502(b)).
197. See id.
198. See Conceptus, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. C 09-02280 WHA, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109598, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (“The[ ] three requirements [to preclude
waiver] are separate and should not be conflated in the analysis; in particular, inadvertence under the first prong does not turn on the reasonable steps taken to prevent
mistaken disclosure addressed in the second prong.”) (internal citation omitted).
199. Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892, at *3.
200. See, e.g., Boehning & Toal, supra note 191 (“Just when you thought it was
safe to enter into ‘quick peek’ and ‘clawback’ agreements, along comes Spieker v.
Quest Cherokee, LLC.”).
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construction rules as well as the FRE Committee’s comments, comments
such as: “[A] court order may provide for return of documents without
waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party; the rule contemplates enforcement of ‘clawback’ and ‘quick peek’ arrangements as a
way to avoid the excessive costs of preproduction review for privilege and
work product.”201 As a practical matter it is likely courts will be encouraging and enforcing these agreements as a matter of necessity.202 Our use of
ESI will only continue to grow.
One other area of interest in Spieker is Judge Humphreys’ response
to Quest’s claim that it was unable to conduct an in-house ESI search
because its employees had no experience with document production.203
The judge responded by stating the following: “[D]efendant’s assertions
that its IT employees have no experience producing discovery in litigation carries no weight. This court is aware of no case where a party has
been excused from producing discovery because its employees ‘have not
previously been asked to search for and/or produce discovery materials.”204 The judge ultimately granted Spieker’s motion to compel production of documents due undoubtedly to Quest’s failure to cooperate in
even a minimal manner on the ESI document request.205 In short, it appears the judge was punishing Quest’s lack of cooperation.
Heriot v. Byrne, discussed previously, is notable for a number of reasons.206 First, like the judge in Coburn, Magistrate Judge Ashman found in
Heriot that the use of paralegals and non-lawyers to manage the E-discovery was not an automatic disqualification for relief under FRE 502.207
Second, the judge determined that factors that predated Rule 502 could
be used to determine whether the tests of Rule 502(b) were satisfied.208
The judge indicated he did not agree with the Rhoads approach.209 Third,
201. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (d). Although this wording is
not included in the Advisory Committee’s Notes to subdivision (e), the committee
indicates that the difference between (d) and (e) is the enforcement against non-parties See FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (e). Thus, presumably the
same theory of no required preproduction review applies to (e).
202. For an excellent discussion of the problematic approach of Spieker, see
Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra, note 119, ¶79 (“Rulings such as that rendered
in Spieker fly in the face of the clear intent of Rule 502 and ignore the rule’s explicit
provisions.”).
203. Spieker, 2009 WL 2168892 at *3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *3–5.
206. 257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
207. See id. at 660.
208. Id. at 655 (stating “the court may, but need not, use some or all of the Judson factors to assess whether FRE 502(b)’s requirements have been satisfied”).
209. Id. at 655 n.7.
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Judge Ashman found that although the disclosure was not insignificant
(13 percent of all documents produced), it would be unfair to penalize a
party for the errors of its document review vendor, in this case Open
Door Solutions, LLP.210 He specifically found that “[p]laintiffs had no
duty to re-review the documents after providing them to the Vendor,” as
this would be “duplicative, wasteful and against the spirit of FRE 502.”211
The judge added that if such a duty were imposed it “would chill the use
of e-vendors, which parties commonly employ to comply with onerous
electronic discovery.”212 Further, the judge stated, “Plaintiffs relied, and
should be able to rely, on their Vendor to faithfully carry out the instructions it has been given.”213 Finally, the judge stated, “how the disclosing
party discovers and rectifies the disclosure is more important than when
after the inadvertent disclosure the discovery occurs.”214
In Amobi v. Department of Corrections, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia followed the same reasoning as the Coburn
court on whether factors outside of the text of Rule 502 should be considered by a court.215 The magistrate judge in Amobi found that the threepart test of Rule 502 (b) (Rule 502(b)(1), (2), and (3)) provides for a very
simple analysis of the term “inadvertent,” and he followed the definition
given in Coburn.216 On the other hand, the judge mentioned factors set
forth by the FRE Advisory Committee about reasonable steps taken to
prevent the disclosure.217 He ultimately determined that the Department
of Corrections did not take reasonable steps to avoid the disclosure.218 It
is clear from the opinion that the Department did little to prove it took
reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure, and the judge stated the following: “Thus, while Rule 502(b) would in essence allow me to round up
the animals and put them back in the barn, defendants have not provided

210. See id. at 651, 660–62 (“this Court also considered the unfairness of penalizing Plaintiffs for an error that it neither caused nor anticipated.”).
211. Id. at 660.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 262 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2009).
216. See id. at 53. Magistrate Judge Facciola added this humorous line: “Lawyers
make inadvertent mistakes; it is judges who never make mistakes.” Id. at 54. One
court took an even easier route to determine inadvertence, “if the material is clearly
privileged, the court presumes that the party did not intend to produce it.” Michael J.
Burg & Richard Hunter, A Review of How Courts Are Analyzing New Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, 78 U.S.L.W. 2499 (Mar. 2010) (citing Preferred Care Partners Holding
Corp. v. Humana, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 684 (S.D. Fla. 2009)).
217. Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 54.
218. Id. at 55.
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any evidence that they took reasonable efforts to keep the barn door
closed.”219
Although a thorough analysis of all cases decided under Rule 502 is
beyond the scope of this article, certain findings may be illustrated by
these and some of the other cases decided in 2009.220 For example, many
courts decided that the burden of proof under Rule 502 is on the party
claiming the benefit of FRE 502.221 The facts and circumstances of disclosures are of utmost importance, but courts are using various tests and
factors to analyze those facts and circumstances.222 One court stated that
219. Id. Judge Facciola takes this animal analogy from Victor Stanley. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D, 257, 263 (D. Md. 2008).
220. This article investigates the general findings of courts over a three-year period in broad strokes. Certainly a more detailed analysis could be performed in another article at some point in the future.
221. See, e.g., Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53 (“In this district, prior to the enactment of
the rule [502], ‘the proponent of the privilege . . . [had] the burden of showing that it
[had] not waived attorney-client privilege.’ I see no reason why Rule 502 can be interpreted to modify that rule and I will apply it.”) (citations omitted); Callan v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 564, 566 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he Court adopts the ‘standard practice[,]’ which is to place the burden on the party claiming inadvertent disclosure”); United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275, 2009 WL 2905474, at *3
(D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Plaintiff, the disclosing party, has the burden to prove that the
elements of FRE 502(b) have been met.”); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D 645, 658 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (“Prior to the 2008 amendment of FRE 502, ‘the burden of proving inadvertent disclosure [was] on the party asserting the privilege.’ This Court sees no reason to
modify this approach and so applies it to FRE 502(b).”) (citations omitted).
222. See, e.g., Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 502 (2009)
(citing the Advisory Committee’s eight factors for determining whether inadvertent
disclosure is a waiver, but stressing two factors in particular: “the extent to which an
attempt was made to rectify the disclosure and the amount of time taken to rectify an
inadvertent disclosure”) (citation omitted); Sensient Colors, Inc., 2009 WL 2905474, at
*3 n.8 (using a multifactor test consisting of the “reasonableness of precautions taken,
the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure and
the overriding issue of fairness . . . the number of documents to be reviewed and the
time constraints for production . . . [yet] [n]o one factor is dispositive”); Infor
Global Solutions (Michigan), Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. C 08-02621,
2009 WL 2390174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) (describing its test as a “holistic
reasonableness analysis”); Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428–30 (D.N.J. 2009)
(opting for the middle-ground approach, which was described as the Ciba-Geigy approach and includes at least five factors: “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure . . . ; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay and measures taken to rectify the
disclosure, and; (5) . . . the overriding interests of justice”) (citing Ciba-Geigy Corp.
v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J. 1996)); Kumar v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
No. 08-2689 D/P, 2009 WL 1683479, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 16, 2009) (“adopting a
multifactor test that includes the “reasonableness of precautions taken, the time taken
to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure and the overriding
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“[t]he law does not require ‘strenuous or Herculean efforts,’ only ‘reasonable efforts.”223 Although criticized by a commentator, District Judge
Rakoff was correct in his ruling in S.E.C. v. Bank of America Corp. that
even if the parties sign a protective order and that protective order is
incorporated into a court order, non-parties may later challenge whether
the documents subject to the protective order are indeed privileged.224
Judge Rakoff stated “the Protective Order in no way precludes any party
in or any other case from challenging on any other ground Bank of
America’s assertion of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection regarding any information.”225 This only makes sense. The waiver
provisions of FRE 502 of course only apply if a document is actually privileged or protected. Therefore, FRE 502 would not apply at all if a document was not privileged or protected in the first place. The rules of
privilege are to be narrowly construed, and Judge Rakoff applies the rule
correctly.
D. Post-Rule 502 Selected Cases and Rulings: 2010
An interesting case that may strike fear in the heart of practitioners
is Felman Production, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, in which the district
court affirmed the magistrate judge’s ruling that Felman waived privilege
because the “ridiculously high number of irrelevant materials and the
large volume of privileged communications produced demonstrate a lack
of reasonableness.”226 The magistrate judge used the Victor Stanley five-

issue of fairness.”); Heriot, 257 F.R.D at 658 (the court concluded that a better approach was to focus “on the elements required by FRE 502 and use[ ] the Judson
factors, where appropriate, to supplement this analysis.”) (citing Judson Atkinson
Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F. 3d 371 (7th Cir. 2008)).
223. Infor Global Solutions, 2009 WL 2390174, at *2 (citation omitted).
224. S.E.C. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 2009 WL 3297493, at *1
(S.D.N.Y.); see also 2009 Year-End Electronic Discovery and Information Law Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/
2009YearEndElectronicDiscoveryUpdate.aspx (“In effect, [Judge Rakoff[ appeared
to suggest that despite the intention of Rule 502(d), the language of this particular
stipulated order (which in part was phrased in terms of selective waiver) might be
insufficient to prevent a waiver of the privilege.”). Actually, the court was correct.
Rule 502 does not alter the substantive law of privilege—it only provides treatment if
something that is in fact privileged is inadvertently produced.
225. S.E.C., 2009 WL 3297493, at *1.
226. No. 3:09-0481, 2010 WL 2944777, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 23, 2010), aff’g Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D. W.Va. 2010).
Though a recent decision, Felman has already attracted academic and legal attention.
See, e.g., Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119, ¶¶46–50; Ralph Losey, The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: “Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Inc.,” EDiscovery Team, http://e-discoveryteam.com/2010/06/10/the-good-the-bad-and-the-
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factor balancing test and the district court, in its review, found no clear
error, based upon the results of the company’s E-discovery.227 Felman had
produced more than one million pages, but approximately 30 percent of
the documents produced were inadvertently disclosed and “thousands of
attorney-client protected communications were produced.”228 The district
court indicated that “[t]hese facts, standing alone” weighed heavily in its
approval of the magistrate judge’s ruling.229 This is essentially a look no
further approach—if too many privileged or protected documents are released, it is automatically deemed unreasonable. This certainly appears to
be a less flexible approach than that suggested by the FRE Advisory
Committee and one that ultimately may not be advisable.
In Roe v. Saint Louis University, a district judge for the Eastern District of Missouri applied the same five factors from Victor Stanley, but
took the test from Gray v. Bicknell, a case from the Eighth Circuit.230 In
Roe, the court found that St. Louis University waived work product protection based upon the factors from Gray and indicated that “[t]he threepage chronology was provided as part of a document production consisting of only 82 pages, and the University’s sole explanation for the inadvertent disclosure was a supposed copying error committed after counsel
completed her review.”231
On the other hand, in North American Rescue Products, Inc. v.
Bound Tree Medical, LLC, the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio specifically found that the five-factor balancing test was not required.232 According to the court, “Rule 502 does not set forth a fivefactor test for determining waiver; instead, Rule 502(b) sets forth three
elements that must be met in order to prevent the disclosure of privileged
materials from operating as waiver.”233 Instead, the court stated that the
five-factor test, argued by the plaintiff as applying, predated Rule 502 and
merely serves as guide to a court’s analysis when appropriate based on
the circumstances of each case.234 Thus, the court found that the only required test is the one set forth in the text of Rule 502(b).235
ugly-%E2%80%9Cmt-hawley-ins-co-v-felman-production-inc-%E2%80%9D/ (last
visited June 19, 2011).
227. Id.
228. Id. at *4.
229. Id.
230. No. 4:08CV1474 JCH, 2010 WL 199948 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2010) (citing Gray
v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1996)).
231. Id. at *2.
232. No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2010), at *8.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *9.
235. Id. at *8.
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This is similar to the treatment used by the Laethem court described
previously.236 Moreover, it illustrates that the FRE Advisory Committee
probably did not intend a new test, as it was aware of the five-factor test
but did not incorporate it. Instead, the test incorporated in Rule 502 is
clear for practitioners and results in more predictability.
There is also evidence, from at least one court’s opinion, that for
Rule 502 to be operative parties must execute a formal agreement. In
Community Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., Magistrate
Judge Magnus-Stinson clarified that an informal “courtesy” does not
qualify as an agreement under Rule 502(e).237 Community Bank (Community) sued Progressive Casualty Insurance (Progressive) over coverage, and during the discovery phase, Progressive inadvertently disclosed
many documents.238 Not only did Community destroy what had been produced, once notified by Progressive, it also informed Progressive that it
had also produced other, possibly protected, documents.239 Community’s
counsel sent a letter to Progressive enclosing some potentially privileged
documents and stated, in part, the following: “I trust that you will be similarly accommodating if we ask for the return of inadvertently produced
privileged/protected documents in the future. And I hope we will not face
a debate about ‘inadvertently,’ diligent review, etc.”240
Progressive responded, “I appreciate your courtesy in this regard
and the consideration you afforded us in that regard. Should the occasion
arise, you can expect the same courtesy in return.”241 However, rather
than return the “courtesy,” Progressive proceeded to file a motion for
summary judgment that attached two of Community’s privileged documents.242 Community argued that it had an agreement with Progressive
under Rule 502(e) and those documents were privileged and the privilege
had not been waived.243 Judge Magnus-Stinson disagreed, finding that the
courtesy language was “too amorphous to be binding.”244 She determined
the wording in issue was moral in nature, but did not create a legally
binding agreement under Rule 502(e).245
236. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
237. No. 1:08-cv-01443-WTL-JMS, 2010 WL 1435368, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8,
2010).
238. Id. at *1–2.
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *2–3.
244. Id. at *3.
245. Id. The judge ultimately decided that Progressive violated FRCP 26(b)(5)
because it used the two documents in a motion before this issue had been resolved. Id.

R
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Furthermore, in Trustees of the Electrical Workers Local No. 26
Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., Magistrate Judge Facciola found that Rule 502 “abolishes the dreaded subject-matter waiver,
i.e., that any disclosure of privileged matter worked a forfeiture of any
other privileged information that pertained to the same subject matter.”246 According to Judge Facciola, “the disclosure of privilege information may lead to the additional and compelled disclosure of additional
privileged information, if they concern the same subject matter and ought
in fairness be considered together.”247 Furthermore, he clarified that if the
information disclosed was not privileged in the first place, there is no such
provision, so that “it is perfectly legitimate for a party to disclose a nonprivileged communication but to decline to disclose a privileged communication, even though the privileged communication would prove that the
party is lying through his teeth.”248 Thus, the “ought in fairness to be considered together” language prevents a party from using the attorney–client privilege and work product doctrine as both a shield and a
sword. The privilege was never meant to act as a sword.
In DJ Coleman, Inc. v. Nufarm Americas, Inc. the U.S. District
Court for the District of North Dakota shed some light on the actual
number of documents that may or may not be considered “voluminous.”249 In this case, the district judge did not believe the production of
850 pages of documents was voluminous.250 Nufarm gave DJ Coleman
eight potentially protected documents, and the judge found “the extent of

at *4. As a sanction, the judge said that Progressive could not use the documents as
substantive evidence in the case. Id. at *5. In the context of electronic discovery,
courts are likely to deal harshly with parties found to have engaged in the spoliation
of relevant documents. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Bank of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp.2d 456, 479–80, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding
that the actions of plaintiff’s counsel amounted to gross negligence and imposing
sanctions).
246. 266 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 10.
249. No. 1:08-cv-051, 2010 WL 731110, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb. 25, 2010).
250. Id.; see also Lisa C. Wood & Ara B. Gershengorn, Rule 502: Does It Deliver
on Its Promise?, 24 ANTITRUST 3, at 85 (2010), available at http://www.foleyhoag.com/
Services/Litigation/publications.aspx (follow “Rule 502: Does It Deliver on Its Promise?”) (“The size of the production appears to be a significant factor in courts’ determinations. Thus, for example, where a party produced only 850 pages of documents,
the court noted that ‘[t]his was not a case in which the document was produced as part
of a voluminous production,’ contrasting the situation with another case in which 22
privileged documents were mistakenly produced along with 16,000 other documents”)
(quoting DJ Coleman, Inc., 2010 WL 731110, at *4).
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disclosure is potentially significant.”251 While determining it was a close
case, the judge found the privilege was not waived because it “is consistent with the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which is designed
for the client’s benefit and generally advances the overriding interests of
justice.”252
Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP is another case that may send a chill down a practicing attorney’s spine.253 The
parties had a general protective order that provided that inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents “shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege.”254 Oddly enough, District Court Judge Moskowitz found that Luna
Gaming’s “repeated failures to object to the use of the Privileged Documents . . . waived any protections it could have invoked under the Protective Order.”255 He believed that the protective order should have
included a provision addressing “under what circumstances failure to object to the use of inadvertently produced privileged documents waives the
privilege.”256 In his analysis, Judge Moskowitz considered only the three
subparts of Rule 502(b) and found Luna Gaming lacking on the third
element, promptly taking reasonable steps to rectify the error.257 This type
of reasoning certainly provides a disincentive for parties to work together, as they would never be able to predict how a judge would rule on
their agreement. This is not advisable in our current environment of highcost litigation. Ultimately the clients are not well served.
E. Post-Rule 502 Selected Cases and Rulings: 2011
There are some 2011 cases dealing with waivers made in a federal
proceeding and when such a waiver may extend to cover further undisclosed matters under Rule 502(a), as well as when inadvertent disclosures
do not serve as waivers under Rule 502(b). Rule 502(a) waivers involve
the determination of when a disclosure made “in a Federal proceeding or
to a Federal office or agency” may extend also to serve as a waiver for an
undisclosed communication in that proceeding. In addition to the requirements of 502(a)(1) and (2) that the waiver be “intentional,” and the
disclosed and undisclosed communications concern “the same subject

251. DJ Coleman, 2010 WL 731110, at *1, *4.
252. Id. at *4.
253. No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).
254. Id. at *4.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *4–7 (Judge Moskowitz did not address the other two elements “because the Court has affirmed the magistrate judge’s finding regarding the first element, and second element is not disputed”).
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matter,” subparagraph (3) requires a further finding that that “they ought
in fairness to be considered together.” In In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, the court held that when the witness testified beyond the explanation of what actions she took regarding her notes and discussed what her
attorneys instructed her to do with the notes, she waived the attorney–client privilege.258 Thus, when she responded that she didn’t remember whether they asked her to give them a copy of the notes, the court
ruled that response also waived further undisclosed communications
about the instructions from the lawyer.259 The court applied the “ought in
fairness” factor to require the answer to the further questions, because
“Rule 502(a) requires consideration of disclosed and undisclosed communication together in order to avoid a misleading and incomplete presentation of information.”260
In Seyler v. T-Systems North America, Inc., the court did not extend
the waiver to undisclosed matters under Rule 502(a) because the disclosure of the plaintiff’s one e-mail exchanged with her sister (who happened to be an attorney) was not “intentional.”261 Furthermore,
borrowing the standard from Eden Isle Marina—a weighing of the circumstances approach to the fairness requirement262—the Seyler court further concluded that under these circumstances, where the plaintiff had no
intent to use the disclosed e-mail, this is not a situation where the “fairness” requirement mandated extension of the waiver to allow further discovery of material at the sister’s law firm.263
In Pilot v. Focused Realty Property I, LLC the trial judge grappled
with the two differing approaches used in his judicial district to determine
502(a)(1) inadvertence—i.e., the multifactor approach used before enactment of Rule 502, as applied in Heriot v. Byrne, and the intent approach
used in Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC.264 In doing so,
the Pilot court opted for “the simpler method, because [in its view] the
Rule 502(b)(1) poses a straightforward question of intent,” while “the
multi-factor approach is redundant . . . [because it] simply restate[s] the
inquiries spelled out in Rule 502(b)(2) and (3).”265 The court went on,
258.
2011).
259.
260.
261.
2011).
262.
263.
264.
2011).
265.

No. 04-MD-1616-JWL, 2011 U.S. dist. LEXIS 9923, at *42 (D. Kan. Jan. 31,
Id.
Id.
No. 10 Misc. 7 (JGK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6065, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21,
See Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 480, 503 (2009).
Seyler, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6065, at *9.
No. 09 C 6879, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33710, at * 10–11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
Id. at *11.
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however, to conclude, that although the disclosure was inadvertent, plaintiffs waived the privilege because they had failed to take reasonable steps
to prevent the disclosure and to rectify their error as required by Rule
502(b)(2) and (3).266
Finally, in Datel Holdings, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the court made
clear that the three requirements of Rule 502(b) are separate and distinct
and there should be no reasonableness requirement for the inadvertence
inquiry.267 This is the same approach advocated by Magistrate Judge
Grimm and his coauthors in their 2011 law review article.268
F. Post-Rule 502 Rulings and Cases: Conclusions, Themes, and
Questions
There are a few basic principles that derive from the foregoing
cases. First, and not surprisingly, it is often a question of fact whether
Rule 502 applies,269 and the party claiming relief under FRE 502 bears the
burden of proving it applies.270 Second, courts seem to welcome new Rule
502 as an improvement to pre-Rule 502 law;271 in fact, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended its passage.272 Third, courts agree

266. Id. at *10–18.
267. No. C-09-05535 EDL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30872, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
11, 2011).
268. Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119, ¶100 (“[R]easonableness of
pre-production procedures should not be a consideration in determining whether production of attorney–client privileged documents was inadvertent under Rule
502(b)(1). The more useful approach is to equate “inadvertence” under Rule
502(b)(1) with ‘mistaken’ or ‘unintentional’ production.”). A fascinating opinion on
electronic discovery and metadata was issued by District Court Judge Shira A.
Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) on Jan. 7, 2001, http://www.ediscoverylawalert.com/uploads/
file/2011_U_S__Dist__LEXIS_11655.pdf. On June 17, 2011, Judge Scheindlin withdrew her Order of Feb. 7, 2011, because “the parties have recently resolved their
dispute.” See http://e-discoveryteam.com/2011/02/07/new-opinion-by-judgescheindlin-on-foia-metadata-and-cooperation.
269. See, e.g., Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216,
224–26 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (weighing various factors to determine whether privilege was
waived); Valentin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 09 Civ. 9448, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40711, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011) (“Finding a waiver is a fact-sensitive
determination dependent on factors that vary from case to case.) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
270. See supra note 221.
271. See, e.g., Trs. of the Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust
Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 11 (stating that Rule 502 “abolishes the dreaded
subject-matter waiver”).
272. See Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, supra note 94.

R

R

R
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that E-discovery poses challenges that they could not have envisioned
even ten years ago.273
Among the challenges are those that derive from the fact that many
parties are now relying on outside vendors to help them collect and sort
through massive amounts of documents.274 As far back as June 2007, The
Sedona Conference275 Working Group stated “[t]he number of vendors in
the electronic discovery business has ballooned in recent years, and there
are now hundreds of companies offering electronic discovery services in
one form or another.”276 This appears to be a prudent practice if a party is
later subject to a FRE 502 hearing.277 Under those circumstances courts
will have to evaluate the conduct of those vendors, as well as that of the
parties, the lawyers, and their more traditional assistants.278 Courts also
seem to agree that the use of a paralegal or non-lawyer does not automatically equate to unreasonableness.279

273. See, e.g, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119, ¶6 (“With such exorbitant costs, ‘insist[ing] in every case upon ‘old world’ record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production
that bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation.’ ”) (quoting Hopson v.
Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005)).
274. See Fulbright’s 6th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report, FULBRIGHT &
JAWORSKI L.L.P. 59 (2009), available at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends08
(according to a survey conducted by Fulbright & Jaworski, 24 percent of respondents
are outsourcing certain E-discovery functions through preferred provider relationships). Twenty-six percent of respondents in the survey indicated that they used “law
firms with specialized E-discovery practices” to reduce E-discovery costs. Id.
275. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, http://www.thesedonaconference.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). “The Sedona Conference is a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) research and
educational institute dedicated to the advanced study of law and policy in the areas of
antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual property rights.” Id.
276. Best Practices for the Selection of Electronic Discovery Vendors: Navigating
the Vendor Proposal Process, THE SEDONA CONF. WORKING GROUP SERIES 3 (June
2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/RFP_
Paper.pdf.
277. See Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 660 (stating that disclosure mistakes were made
after the plaintiffs gave the documents to the vendor and “thus, the procedures used
to review the documents were reasonable, and sufficient to prevent an inadvertent
disclosure. This factor therefore weighs in favor of inadvertent disclosure”).
278. See, e.g., Rhoads Indus., 254 F.R.D. at 226–27; Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D
645, 659, 661–62 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No. 09 C 3607, 2010
WL 4512337, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2010).
279. See, e.g., Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1037–38 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[T]his court joins with Heriot in declining to hold that
the use of paralegals or non-lawyers for document review is unreasonable in every
case.”); Heriot, 257 F.R.D. at 660 n.10 (“this Court declines to hold that a procedure is

R
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Furthermore, as previously discussed, many courts look beyond the
three elements of FRE 502(b) claims of inadvertent disclosure, most
often looking to the Victor Stanley five factors,280 while others limit themselves to the three subsections of FRE 502(b) itself.281 Furthermore, some
courts might follow the Coburn “simple” intent analysis to determine inadvertence, or a more holistic approach.282 All of which makes it incumbent on litigants to be aware of the approach in a particular district, or
among different judges in the district, and to be prepared to litigate the
“approach” question before those courts that have yet to decide on the
issue.
On a related matter, there appears to be some agreement that the
wording used by the FRE Advisory Committee establishes that a reasonable search of the records is not required if parties are relying on FRE
502(d) and (e).283 The one court that has used FRE 502(b)’s “reasonable”
analysis for party agreements seems to be an aberration,284 and some
courts have emphasized that the language of party agreements drafted
with enough specificity may protect parties from waiver of the privilege.285

unreasonable in every case that a paralegal or non-lawyer reviews documents for
privilege.”).
280. See, e.g., Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-0144, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36058, at *12–18 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 1, 2011) (listing and applying the
Victor Stanley factors); Felman Prod., Inc. v. Indus. Risk Ins., No. 3:09-0481, 2010 WL
2944777, at *3–4 (S.D. W.Va. July 23, 2010) (upholding the magistrate judge’s use of
the Victor Stanley factors in determining whether Felman waived privilege); Roe v.
Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:08CV1474 JCH, 2010 WL 199948, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14,
2010) (applying a five-factor test similar to that from Victor Stanley); Rhoads Indus. v.
Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 220–21 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (applying the
Victor Stanley factors).
281. See, e.g., Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere & Co., No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL
4997932, at *8–9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2008); North Am. Rescue Products, Inc. v.
Bound Tree Med., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-101, 2010 WL 1873291, at *8 (S.D. Ohio. May 10,
2010).
282. See, e.g., Amobi v. Dep’t of Corrs., 262 F.R.D. 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating
that the Coburn “interpretation seems to be in line with one of the goals of the drafting committee”); Infor Global Solutions (Michigan), Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., No. C 08-02621, 2009 WL 2390174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) (using a
“holistic reasonableness analysis” the court found the plaintiff waived privilege).
283. See, e.g., Alcon Mfg., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1642-RLY-TAB, 2008
WL 5070465 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2008).
284. See Spieker v. Quest Cherokee, LLC, No. 07-1225-EFM, 2009 WL 2168892,
at *3–5 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009).
285. See Community Bank v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01443WTL-JMS, 2010 WL 1435368, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2010) (“The Court finds, however, such language is too amorphous to be binding.”).
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A number of other questions remain about the application of Rule
502. For example, how often will a court simply resort to the “interests of
justice” and completely minimize the importance of other factors? Also,
what is it that the courts will consider to be sufficient to establish compliance with the notion of substantial disclosure.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect is the differing treatment courts
give to party agreements. Given the onerous task now faced by attorneys
with E-discovery, one would expect courts to heavily favor claw-back or
quick peek agreements, but that is not necessarily so. Unfortunately
courts have treated similar situations differently.286 While it may be expected that courts will differ in their analysis of Rule 502,287 and that differences within the same district may occur,288 the problem is exacerbated
by the fact that magistrate judges generally handle these discovery/privilege disputes.289 In fact, under 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1), district judges

286. See, e.g., Comrie v. IPSCO, Inc., No. 08 C 3060, 2009 WL 4403364, at * 2
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2009) (granting plaintiff’s motion to compel despite that the parties
had a protective order in place, which provided “how to mark confidential documents
and describes the procedures for ‘clawing back’ documents”); Containment Techs.
Grp., Inc. v. American Soc’y of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No. 1:07-cv-997-DFH-TAB,
2008 WL 4545310, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2008) (granting in part and denying in part
plaintiff’s request for a protective order); Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No.
CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008) (holding that Relion
waived privilege because its discovery documents were inspected by attorneys and
support staff, there was no surprise or deception on the part of the opposing party,
and there were numerous opportunities to inspect the documents before opposing
counsel reviewed them).
287. See Cynthia A. Mellon Balmer, Michael J. Weber & Grace W. Cranley, Not
So Fast . . . “Send” Is a Four-Letter Word: The Implications of Electronic Discovery,
15 FIDELITY L.J. 149, 200 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.fidelitylaw.org/
Publications/Journals/PDF/2009/__2009-balmer.pdf. (“The Heriot court criticized the
approach by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials
Corp. of Am., which adopted the approach taken by the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee. . . . However, in a more recent case, Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap
Advisors, LLC, the court criticized the test set forth by Heriot . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
288. Compare Coburn Group, LLC v. Whitecap Advisors, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1037–38 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (applying a multifactored test to determine inadvertence under Rule 502(b)(1), with Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(applying an intent test to determine inadvertence under Rule 502(b)(1)).
289. See Paul Mark Sandler, The World of a U.S. Magistrate Judge: An Interview
with Paul W. Grimm, SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER, (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www
.shapirosher.com/PaulW.Grimm.htm. According to Judge Grimm:
Magistrate judges spend a significant amount of time on the resolution of discovery disputes. There are different philosophies. Some district judges refer
many if not all of their discovery disputes to the magistrate judges. Others
only do it from time to time. As we get into an era of the new Rules of Civil

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX102.txt

232

unknown

Seq: 40

7-NOV-11

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

14:03

[Vol. 41

may delegate pretrial issues to magistrate judges.290 “This authority is frequently used in complex cases to have the magistrate preside over discovery disputes.”291 As of March 2009, there were 517 full-time and 42 parttime authorized magistrate judgeships in the United States.292 There are
ninety-four district courts.293 This leads to many different rulings and
opinions. In a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion, the Justices held that a
decision on a privilege waiver is not reviewable until the final decision by
the court in a case.294 Accordingly, as of June 11, 2011, there is no reported federal appellate court opinion on FRE 502. As the substantive
issues in these cases are tried and some of the cases are appealed, we will
begin to have an indication about how U.S. appellate courts will interpret
FRE 502.295 Hopefully appellate courts will enthusiastically endorse
agreements amongst the parties; this will lead to cost savings and predictability—the very reasons for the creation and addition of Rule 502 to the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
III. THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
AND RULE 502
The inadvertent disclosure rules bring up the issue of client confidentiality. “Despite the protections of Rule 502, parties still cannot ‘put
the genie back in the bottle’ once information has been disclosed—even
inadvertently. Attorneys retain a duty to their clients to safeguard confiProcedure regarding electronically stored information, it may well be that
some of the issues that are expected to arise will be complex and time consuming, so we will probably get additional discovery referrals, and there will
be more work in this area as we learn to deal with these new Rules.

290. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (“a [district] judge may also designate a magistrate
[magistrate judge] to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit
to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion . . . .”).
291. THOMAS SULLIVAN, DOUGLAS FLOYD, RICHARD D. FREER & BRADLEY G.
CLARY, COMPLEX LITIGATION 508 (Mathew Binder LexisNexis 2009).
292. History of the Federal Judiciary: Magistrate Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_magistrate.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
293. District Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal
Courts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx (last visited June 23,
2011).
294. Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (holding that a discovery order on the attorney–client privilege does not qualify for immediate review
under the collateral order doctrine).
295. See Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (in this
case, decided post-Mohawk Industries and on an attorney–client privilege waiver issue, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that Rule 502 did not apply).
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dential information, and the rule does not eliminate that duty.”296 American Bar Association Rule 1.6 sets forth the obligation requiring a lawyer
to protect client confidentiality.297 Neither the new E-discovery FRCP nor
FRE 502 affect a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to his or her client.298
Model Rule 1.6 provides the following (in part):
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).

“Violation of this duty constitutes cause for disbarment or suspension of
the attorney’s license to practice.”299 It may also result in private malpractice damages.300 The Model Rule does not currently address E-discovery
issues, although nine comments have recently been proposed by an academic.301 The Model Rule and individual state ethical rules need to be
modified as a matter of practical necessity.
The Model Rules “[h]owever prominent nationally . . . are not selfexecuting and carry no independent authority—ultimately a lawyer’s ethical obligations are determined by the laws (or rules) of the state (or
states) in which the lawyer is licensed to practice.”302 At least sixteen
states have addressed the issue of inadvertent disclosure and the duty of
confidentiality to one’s client.303 All of these opinions require that the

296. David M. Greenwald, Robert R. Stauffer & Erin R. Schrantz, New Federal
Rule of Evidence 502: A Tool for Minimizing the Cost of Discovery, BLOOMBERG
FINANCE L.P. (2009), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252%5C2399%5CBloomberg_Greenwald_Stauffer_Schrantz.pdf.
297. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
298. See Wang, supra note 8, at 1855–57.
299. Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
673, 745 (2009).
300. See Noyes, supra note 299, at 745.
301. See Schaefer, supra note 11, at 247–49, 254–57 (proposed comments 19–28).
302. Debra Lyn Bassett, E-Pitfalls: Ethics and E-Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV.
449, 451 (2009).
303. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Office of the Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02
(2007); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Counsel, Formal Op. 07-03 (2007); Ethics Comm. of
the Colo. State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 119 (2008); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
341 (2007); Fla. Bar Ethics Dep’t, Op. 06-02 (2006); Ky. Bar Ass’n. Office of Bar
Counsel, Op. KBA E-374 (1995); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 196 (2008); Minn.
Lawyer’s Prof’l Responsibility Board, Op. No. 22 (2010); N.H. Bar Ass’n., Ethics
Comm., Op. 2008–2009/4 (2008–2009), N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 701
(2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001); N.Y. State Bar
Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004); Vt. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2009-1 (2009);
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attorney take “reasonable steps” “reasonable precautions” or “reasonable care” in transmitting a client’s documents and information. As will
become evident below, this creates a problem for an attorney’s use of
FRE 502(d) and (e).
IV. GOING FORWARD—ADVICE FOR ATTORNEYS AND THE
COURTS ON INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE AND
ETHICAL RULES
Given the divergent treatment courts have given Rule 502 as well as
state ethics rules, what advice might be given attorneys and judges who
are faced with the everyday reality of E-discovery (which means every
attorney and judge)? There is a dilemma facing litigators. The discovery
rules are extremely broad but many times the costs of compliance are
extremely high—and thus this current system is unsustainable given the
volume of material and consequent costs.304 There is very little certainty
in this area from the court opinions and rulings. What might be considered voluminous to one judge may not be to another. There is yet to be
agreement on the factors to be weighed and considered, even within a
particular federal district. Judges weigh the factors on a case-by-case baW.Va. Bar Ass’n, Lawyer Disciplinary Board, Formal Op. L.E.O. 2009-1 (2009); see
also Louise Hill, Emerging Technology and Client Confidentiality: How Changing
Technology Brings Ethical Dilemmas, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 27–45 (2010)
(summarizing some of the ethical opinions); Jay T. Westermeier, Recent Ethics Opinion on Metadata Support New Best Practice, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP (June 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=d97d5c0d-7f3d-4b58-9aee-18fa5e35c2a4 (providing a conceptual overview from some recent ethics opinions on discovery documents derived
from metadata); David G. Keyko, Recent Developments in Ethics: E-Discovery, 191
PLI/NY 393 (2009) (listing states and cases various approaches to review of
metadata). The American Bar Association has an excellent chart of ESI opinions.
Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A. (May 3, 2011), http://
www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/fyidocs/metadatachart.html.
304. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (“The Court has more than
once declared that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil
trials.”); Navigating the Hazards of E-discovery: A Manual for Judges in State Courts
Across the Nation, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. AT THE
UNIV. OF DENV. 8 (2007), available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Ediscovery.pdf (stating that “the costs of electronic discovery can be staggering, often
totaling hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars in a given case”) [hereinafter Navigating the Hazards of E-discovery]; SULLIVAN, FLOYD, FREER & CLARY,
supra note 291, at 644 (relying on a survey which found that more than 75 percent of
trial lawyers believe that discovery costs have increased disproportionately as a share
of litigation costs due to E-discovery) (citation omitted).
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sis, which gives flexibility but also breeds uncertainty. Party agreements
certainly assist the parties but judges have even differed on the treatment
of these. Party agreements also pose problems under the state ethical
rules.305
The FRE Advisory Committee purposely proposed a “flexible” test
for inadvertent disclosure under FRE 502.306 It is a test of reasonableness,
so of course reasonable minds may differ.307 On the other hand, one of
the purposes of the rule was a “predictable, uniform set of standards
under which parties can determine the consequences of a disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection.”308 If faced with uncertainty, parties would be
well advised to seek a court’s “blessing” under FRE 502(d), because, as
the committee notes indicate, a court could provide for the return of documents “without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party.”309 The problem is that this very notion is contrary to the state ethics opinions, which require reasonable actions.310 Thus, an attorney risks
violating his or her state bar ethical rules if he or she enters into an agreement with opposing counsel and does not exercise reasonable care when
disclosing documents and information. Certainly an attorney must always
exercise reasonable care but party agreements should be encouraged.
Moreover, court recognition of party agreements will motivate parties to
cooperate, and thus most courts should encourage such agreements, and
ethical rules should follow suit.
Parties have a natural aversion to providing privileged or protected
documents and information—once the information is provided, the “cat
is out of the bag.” An attorney, has a personal as well as a professional
interest in guarding client secrets and his or her own work product. If the
attorney is sloppy or negligent, there will be no relief under Rule 502(b)
and although there will generally be no subject-matter waiver under
502(a), he or she will pay the price on that particular document or information, as the privilege will be waived.311 Additionally attorneys risk
sanctions from their state bar association as well as potential malpractice
liability to the client.

305. For an excellent discussion of the varying treatment by courts of Rule 502,
see Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119.
306. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (b).
307. See id.
308. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note.
309. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee’s note (d).
310. See supra notes 302–303 and accompanying text.
311. See FED. R. EVID. 502 (a), (b).
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Courts are well aware of the dilemma attorneys face in the digital
age. The rules of broad discovery have hit a roadblock called ESI.312
“[D]iscovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but also about how
much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter.”313 Courts should
freely incorporate the terms of the parties’ agreement in a court order if
requested to do so. Attorneys will naturally avoid disclosing client information that is protected or privileged and the courts should strongly encourage cooperation among parties. As a result, the courts will be
cognizant that not only are these agreements and orders binding the parties to the litigation, they are also binding non-parties once incorporated
through a court order.314 However, a non-party may always assert that
there is no privilege or protection for the document or information itself
and thus the protective order would not apply.315 The freely granted protective order is particularly problematic with respect to work product, because that protection is not absolute.316
Attorneys should seek informed consent from their clients, as this
may protect them from state bar ethical violations as well as damages
from malpractice. It is also possible that protective orders agreed upon by
the parties and sanctioned by a court may pass the “disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation” provision of
Rule 1.6 from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.317
District courts should consider creating a universal protocol for ESI.
Uniform application of Rule 502 will only become more important in the
years ahead, as nearly every case begins to have E-discovery issues.318 “Ediscovery is quickly becoming a fact of life for all courts, at every level.
Every kind of civil action, from complex commercial litigation to domes312. See Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on
“Information Inflation” and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 9, ¶5 (2011), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article9.pdf. (“[T]he
greater challenge [to the legal profession] is how best to reasonably (not perfectly)
manage the exponentially growing amount of ESI caught in, and subject to, modernday discovery practice.”).
313. Rowe Entm’t v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
314. See FED. R. EVID. 502 committee comment (e) (“The rule makes clear that if
parties want protection against non-parties from a finding of waiver by disclosure, the
agreement must be made part of a court order.”).
315. See Trs. of the Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund
Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (a non-party may always assert that there
is no substantive privilege at all, and Rule 502 is inapplicable in that case).
316. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (stating that “[t]he
privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute”).
317. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (a) (2002).
318. Navigating the Hazards of E-discovery, supra note 304, at 2.
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tic relations cases, has seen increased use of electronically stored information.”319 Criminal cases are beginning to feel the effects as well. Forensic
data analysis of computer files and Twitter messages have been performed in criminal cases.320 However, in criminal cases the effect may be
less dramatic, as generally less data is stored by individuals than by companies. In 2009, it was estimated that e-mail alone accounted for 247 billion messages sent per day.321 In 2013, it is expected to be 507 billion
messages per day.322 For those e-mail messages in the business setting, it is
estimated that 75 percent contain proprietary information.323
The Sedona Conference, a nonprofit group made up of “leading jurists, lawyers, experts, academics and others, at the cutting edge of issues
in the area of . . . complex litigation,” has, through its Working Groups,
provided “best practices” guidelines concerning protective order and confidentiality issues.324 Due to the explosion of ESI, these helpful guides
from The Sedona Conference should be issued much more frequently and
the organization, a 501(c)(3) entity, should be supported. Attorneys
should also pay close attention to the experts, academics, and attorneys
who have published in the field.325
V. CONCLUSION
Complex litigation, or even relatively simple litigation calls for the
retrieval, review, and exchange of ESI. Not only is it difficult to retrieve
and review, it is exceedingly costly to do so. “In one recent case, for example, a litigant spent eighteen months and $11.4 million to hire contract
319. Id.; see also Janet Kornblum, Getting a Divorce? Be Aware of What’s in Your
E-mail, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2008, at 9D (describing how matrimonial lawyers have
seen an increase in divorce cases in which evidence taken from electronic data is used
to prove a spouse’s incriminating behavior).
320. See Joseph Goldstein, In Social Media Postings, a Trove for Investigators,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/nyregion/03facebook
.html (“As Twitter, Facebook and other forms of public electronic communication
embed themselves in people’s lives, the postings, rants and messages that appear online are emerging as a new trove for the police and prosecutors to sift through after
crimes.”).
321. Press Release, Radicati Group, Inc., Email Statistics Report, 2009–2013
(May 6, 2009), http://www.radicati.com/?p=3237.
322. Id.
323. Navigating the Hazards of E-discovery, supra note 304, at 4.
324. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, http://www.thesedonaconference.org (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
325. See, e.g., SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE (West 2009); Grimm, Bergstrom & Kraeuter, supra note 119.
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attorneys to review electronic documents culled from 127 document custodians for privilege prior to production.”326 The current system of attorney discovery requests and thorough attorney review is simply not
sustainable in many cases. The new E-discovery civil procedure rules and
the FRE on inadvertent disclosure were not only necessary, but compelled by the digital age. As technology progresses, so must attorneys,
courts, bar associations, and advisory groups. Attorneys need to cooperate, enter into agreements with opposing counsel, and secure informed
consent from their clients. Courts need to establish district-wide and preferably nationwide protocols on ESI and inadvertent disclosure so that
there is uniformity and predictability for parties. Outside interested parties (such as the Sedona Conference) need to assist the courts and parties
by suggesting “best practices” for ESI issues. Rule 502 is not a “get-outof-jail-free” provision for attorneys. Thus far, there has not been any evidence of cost savings.327 More work needs to be done, to ensure that clients, lawyers, and courts have reasonable ways to resolve conflicts in the
digital age.328 Certainly Rule 502 is an improvement over past law on the
waiver of privileges and protections, but much work needs to be done to
protect attorneys and their clients.

326. Donald Wochna, Electronic Data, Electronic Searching, Inadvertent Production of Privileged Data: A Perfect Storm, 43 AKRON L. REV. 847, 854 (2010) (citing
Oracle v. SAP AG, 2009 WL 3009059, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).
327. See Fulbright’s 6th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report, supra note 274,
at 62 (only 1 percent of respondents to the survey on electronic discovery indicated
they had experienced “significant” cost savings and 89 percent indicated that they had
experienced no savings).
328. See Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments
to the Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are Revitalizing
the Civil Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶60 (“The deluge of data threatens
to overwhelm our civil justice system, driving the cost of resolving conflicts through
that system beyond the benefit of doing so.”)
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